Michigan Journal of International Law
Volume 12

Issue 2

1990

Japan, SII and the International Harmonization of Domestic
Economic Practices
Gary R. Saxonhouse
University of Michigan

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil
Part of the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gary R. Saxonhouse, Japan, SII and the International Harmonization of Domestic Economic Practices, 12
MICH. J. INT'L L. 450 (1991).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol12/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

JAPAN, SII AND THE INTERNATIONAL
HARMONIZATION OF DOMESTIC
ECONOMIC PRACTICES
Gary R. Saxonhouse*
INTRODUCTION

The Structural Impediments Initiative ("S11") discussions, the first
stage of which concluded with a report on June 28 of last year, have
been heralded as a new departure in international economic relations.
Instead of talking about the removal of barriers at national borders,
the United States and Japan have been discussing the relationship between international trade, international payments balances and domestic economic institutions. Trade negotiators have been exploring
whether the harmonization of domestic economic institutions can allow for more intimate as well as more balanced economic relations
between the United States and Japan. Concern with the international
harmonization of institutions often seems at odds with the theory of
comparative advantage. This article suggests, however, that there are
new developments in the theory of international trade which indicate
that the harmonization of domestic institutions among trading partners may well enhance the welfare of all concerned. In practice, however, a number of the proposals being urged on the Japanese in the
specific context of SII may have consequences quite the opposite of
what is expected by their proponents.

I.

TRADE PERFORMANCE, TRADE THEORY AND TRADE POLICY

If the record of global trade over the past one hundred years is
examined, excluding the ten years of war and dislocation between the
mid-1930s and the mid-1940s, there remain two rather distinct fortyfive-year periods.
In the first period, which extended from the late nineteenth century to the mid-1930s, global trade lagged well behind growth in world
economic production. International trade was an increasingly less important part of economic activity. This lag was true not only globally,
but also for each of the major industrialized economies, with the single
exception of Japan.'
* Professor of Economics, University of Michigan.
1. See A. MADDISON,

PHASES OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT

apps. A, F (1982).
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There is nothing unusual in this performance. Surprising as it may
now seem, for much of both the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, it was commonplace for economists to believe that as nations
grew, trade would grow less important. In 1821 Robert Torrens
wrote, "As the several nations of the world advance in wealth and
population, the commercial intercourse between them must gradually
' '2
become less important and beneficial.
Torrens' views were elaborated on by succeeding generations of
economists. At the turn of the century, Werner Sombart formulated
'3
the so-called "law of the declining importance of export trade."
Later economists such as Dennis Robertson and John Maynard
Keynes suggested that increasing wealth extinguishes the need for
4
trade.
At the core of these analyses is the theory of comparative advantage. Increasing wealth is understood as making advanced countries
more alike. The theory of comparative advantage predicts that the
more countries are alike the less they will trade. In its way this theory
provides the intellectual rationale for why international trade regimes
such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") traditionally have viewed domestic economic institutions as beyond their
purview. Provided national treatment is accorded foreign participants, countries can organize their domestic economies however they
wish. Barriers at the border reduce trade volume, and the goal of the
international regime is to remove these barriers. By contrast, domestic
institutions, however different they may be, are generally left alone
because their consequences are arguably pro-trade.
What has just been sketched out is an old view. Facts have
changed, theories have changed and even the international regime is
changing. In the forty-five years since 1945, global trade has run well
ahead of global Gross National Product ("GNP"), in marked contrast
to preceding years. Again, this is true not only in aggregate, but also
for all the major industrialized economies. And Japan's behavior remains a bit different. Among the major industrialized economies in
the post-war period, Japan has experienced by far the smallest rise in
its trade-to-GNP ratio. 5
What has caused this divergent behavior? The past forty-five years
2. R. TORRENS, ESSAY ON THE PRODUCTION OF WEALTH 288 (1821), quoted in R. LIPSEY,
PRICE AND QUANTITY TRENDS IN THE FOREIGN TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES 37 n. 1 (1963).
3. W. SOMBART, DIE DEUTSCHE VOLKSWIRTSCHAFT IM NEUNZEHNTEN JAHRHUNDERT

368-70, 388 (1923).
4. See Keynes, NationalSelf-Sufficiency, YALE REV. 755, 760 (Summer 1933).
5. See A. MADDISON, supra note 1, at apps. A, F.
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have witnessed unprecedented improvement in the prosperity of the
most advanced industrialized economies. On the basis of past experience and traditional theory, trade should have grown slowly, particularly among these economies. Yet just the opposite has occurred. The
most obvious reason for this change in performance is well known: the
past forty-five years have seen a sharp reversal in the protectionist
trends which dominated international commercial policy in the early
decades of the twentieth century. As important as the change in international commercial policy has been, however, it is insufficient to explain the explosion of post-war trade.
In the last decade or so, economists have increasingly appreciated
that a large share of international trade is driven by considerations
other than simple differences in local conditions. If allowance is made
for the reality that any given industry will produce not one but a wide
variety of goods and that these varieties are likely to be produced by
technologies characterized by scale economies, countries will specialize not so much by industry as by variety of good. In consequence,
newer trade theories predict that differences between countries may
actually undercut rather than promote trade. By contrast, the more
countries resemble each other, the more varieties of mutually desired
products will be produced and the more beneficial trade will be. This
new theory fits the experience of the past forty-five years. The great
increase in the prosperity of the post-war period has led to a sharp
decline in the variance of per capita GNP among the advanced industrialized economies, and with this new convergence of living standards
has come an explosion in international trade. 6
In the years before 1945, international trade meant exporting
goods from one group of industries and importing the goods of a different group. In the past forty-five years, however, international trade
has more often meant both importing and exporting goods from the
very same industry. Today countries specialize to take advantage of
economies of scale and exchange different varieties of the same product. Economists generally call the old kind of trade inter-industry
trade while the new trade is described as intra-industry trade. 7 The
new trade theory incorporating economies of scale and differentiated
products is an effort to explain intra-industry trade.
The two different kinds of trade can have very different consequences for international economic relations. Inter-industry trade
6. See Helpman, Imperfect Competition and International Trade: Evidence from Fourteen
Industrial Countries, I J. JAPAN. & INT'L ECON. 62, 74 (1987).
7. E. HELPMAN & P. KRUGMAN, MARKET STRUCTURE AND FOREIGN TRADE 131-32

(1985).
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based on differences between countries can have politically contentious
consequences for national income distribution. A country with scarce
and expensive labor resources will import labor-intensive goods from
countries with cheap labor. This makes the country as a whole better
off but it leaves labor and its representatives protesting liberal trade
policies. By contrast, trade which is undertaken by countries which
are quite similar to each other, and which primarily involves exchanging different varieties of similar goods produced using similar technologies, is unlikely to have the income redistribution consequences and
political ramifications of inter-industry trade.
There have always been important political constituencies in the
major industrialized nations supporting trade in otherwise unavailable
natural resource products. The great post-war success in removing
barriers to international trade among the advanced industrialized nations has been built upon joining this traditional support to new constituencies supporting the highly beneficial and non-disruptive trade
based on intra-industry specialization.
Japan is neither a natural-resource-based exporter nor, until possibly very recently, a major participant in intra-industry trade. Japan's
continued focus on inter-industry specialization has meant that at best,
even if the expansion of Japanese trade results in a net improvement in
foreign welfare, it will do so at the expense of altering the politically
sensitive international distribution of income. At worst, an expansion
of Japanese trade could reduce foreign welfare by undermining economic rents embodied in the profits and high wages of rival foreign
industries. While there is good reason to believe that, on balance,
growth in Japanese trade has been beneficial, unlike the trade of other
advanced industrialized economies, it has not created powerful liberal
trade constituencies within its trading partners. Rather, the fasterthan-desired structural adjustment imposed on Japan's trading partners has nurtured protectionist interests. As long as the Japanese
economy was relatively small, complaints were localized, confined to
particular sectors and often easily overwhelmed by the broader constituencies favoring more liberal trade. As Japan has become a much
larger force in the global economy, attention has come to focus on the
disruptive features of international trade at the expense of its many
benefits.
Mutually beneficial inter-industry trade is based on the existence of
differences among countries, while mutually beneficial intra-industry
trade is based on similarities among countries. From the Japanese perspective, it is no doubt puzzling that foreign diplomats continually request that Japan become ever more like its trading partners. From the
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perspective of traditional trade theories, removing what is distinctive
about Japan would appear to remove the basis for trade. Other nations, however, are approaching Japan from a different perspective.
By asking Japan to harmonize a wide array of its domestic economic
practices with foreign practices, they are hoping to create a basis for
greatly expanded, mutually beneficial intra-industry trade between Japan and its trading partners. This is viewed as the best hope for reinvigorating the constituency in favor of a liberal trading system.
Whatever the rationale of foreign diplomats, it is by no means clear
what the harmonization of Japanese economic policies with foreign
practices will bring insofar as the structure and volume of Japan's foreign trade are concerned. Japan's failure to participate in a significant
way in intra-industry trade and Japan's distinctive trade performance
in both the pre-war and post-war periods may be due less to distinctive
Japanese government policies than to Japan's geography and distinctive national endowments. By importing massive amounts of foreign
technology in both the pre-war and post-war periods, Japan achieved
rapid technological improvements which allowed more efficient use of
labor resources. Before 1945, unlike all the other major industrialized
economies, labor was relatively abundant in Japan. Rapid, labor-saving technological change made Japan's abundant resource more plentiful, making Japan even more different from its trading partners and
8
accelerating the growth of Japanese trade.
In the post-war period, labor has become as scarce in Japan as in
all the other major industrialized economies. Because it has helped
Japan preserve its scarce resources and reduced Japan's differences
from its trading partners, rapid, labor-saving technological change no
longer has an unambiguously positive impact on the volume of Japanese trade. And technological change has done little in the post-war
period to accelerate that part of trade premised on differences. Japan
is still too different and geographically distant from other major industrialized economies to be a major participant in the fast-growing segment of global trade based on intra-industry specialization. 9
II.

THE STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS INITIATIVE

There is surely little firm legal basis for making the international
harmonization of domestic economic practices the centerpiece of eco8. For an analysis of why trade will increase under these conditions, see Hodjera, Unbiased
Productivity Growth and Increasing Costs, 15 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 244 (1963).
9. See Saxonhouse, Differentiated Products, Economies of Scale, and Access to the Japanese
Market, in TRADE POLICIES FOR INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 145 (R. Feenstra ed.
1989).
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nomic diplomacy with Japan. Article III of the GATT, which discusses the so-called national treatment obligation, specifically rejects
the harmonization of domestic practices. It simply requires that imported goods be accorded the same treatment as goods of local origin
with respect to matters under government control, such as regulation,
taxation and government procurement. Article III notwithstanding,
since May 30, 1989, when the United States announced its intention to
commence the SII discussions, the harmonization of many U.S. and
Japanese domestic economic institutions has become a major element
of U.S. economic policy towards Japan.' 0
For all the publicity surrounding SII, these talks are not nearly so
unique as is generally imagined. During the four years immediately
preceding the SII talks, the United States and Japan had been discussing the harmonization of domestic economic institutions in an exercise
known as the Structural Adjustment Dialogue. I I Indeed, it was generally imagined, particularly on the Japanese side, that SII, which was
tacked on as something of a sop to Congressional critics of Japan when
the Bush Administration made its Super 301 determination in the
spring of 1989, would have much the same form and substance as this
relatively low profile exercise. This forecast has proven to be quite
mistaken.
On an informal basis, at least some of the issues being taken up at
SII have been raised again and again with the Japanese government
for almost two decades. A major part of the SII discussion has been
concerned with undoing the consequences of Japan's Large-Scale Retail Store Law. In 1972, two years before this law was even passed,
U.S. embassy officials and leaders of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan were making speeches denouncing many features of
the Japanese distribution system and the relatively lax Department
Store Law which governed retail expansion before the mid-1970s. The
substance of SII has been on the minds of America's diplomats and
12
businessmen for a long, long time.
However persistent complaints may be about distinctive Japanese
economic practices, the impetus behind the international harmoniza10. The final report on the first phase of the SII discussions, known as the JOINT REPORT OF
[hereinafter THE SII REPORT], was issued June 28, 1990.
11. See W.A. Wallis, Structural Adjustment, Dialogue, and U.S.-Japan Economic Relations,
Address Before the Annual Executive Committee Meeting of the U.S.-Japan Business Council 4
(Feb. 16, 1987) (U.S. Dept. of State, Current Policy No. 924).
12. See, e.g., W. Dizer, Some Observations on the U.S.-Japan Trade Relationship by Japanbased American Businessmen, presented at Joint Meeting of Advisory Council on Japan-U.S.
Economic Relations and Japan-U.S. Economic Council (June 15-17, 1972).
THE U.S.-JAPAN WORKING GROUP ON THE STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS INITIATIVE
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tion of domestic economic practices in recent years has had a much
broader agenda than simply removing the allegedly illegitimate basis
of Japanese economic success. It also concerns a larger global trend.
"EC 92" is also about the international harmonization of domestic
economic institutions, and not only among those in the European
Community. The European Community is demanding that its major
trading partners harmonize their domestic institutions with those of
the Member States. This trend towards international harmonization is
so strong that it is almost possible to amend the famous claim by Lester Thurow that "the GATT is dead" with the query, "Is national
treatment dead?"
All too many commentaries on SII have noted that these discussions have also been unusual in that Japan is being pressured by its
major trading partners to make its economy more efficient by removing all manner of barriers against domestic competition.' 3 Success for
the United States in SII means a more competitive Japanese economy.
While this may indeed be the result of SII, there is nothing at all unusual about this outcome. This is a lesson in economics too little understood. The primary beneficiary of the removal of trade barriers is
almost always the country doing the removing, not the foreign trading
partner seeking market access. It is the nature of economic processes
and not Japanese diplomatic guile that usually makes the Japanese
economy better off after concluding a bitter trade negotiation with the
United States. If Japan in the SII negotiations were really in a position to force American leaders to ignore powerful domestic lobbies
and to remove barriers to American goods, commentators around the
world would be regularly congratulating Washington's negotiators on
skillfully turning Japanese pressure to American economic advantage.
The SII negotiations have been costly in the sense that they have
engaged the energies of American and Japanese government officials at
the very highest levels over a considerable period of time. Have these
discussions been worth this great effort? Are the right issues being
negotiated? Should the talks continue? What will be the impact of the
present set of negotiations?
Six features of the Japanese economy have been addressed in the
SII discussions. 14 These include: 1) saving and investment imbalances;
2) price differentials between Japan and elsewhere; 3) land use; 4) the
13. Frankel, SfI, EKONOMISUTO, June 5, 1990, at 10-13.
14. Seven features of the U.S. economy have also been included in SII. These are: 1) U.S.
saving and investment patterns; 2) corporate investment activities and supply capacity; 3) corporate behavior; 4) government regulations; 5) research and development; 6) export promotion; and
7) workforce education and training. While equal time has been allowed for U.S. and Japanese
topics during the SII negotiations, it is difficult to characterize these discussions as symmetrical.
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distribution system; 5) keiretsu (industrial groups) and 6) exclusionary
business practices. The first two topics have been introduced by
American negotiators in the interest of defining problems that might
be corrected by structural changes within the rubric of the last four
topics.
A.

Savings-Investment Imbalances

The Bush-Uno joint statement issued in July, 1989, at the Bonn
Summit authorizing the S11 talks emphasized the importance of correcting imbalances' in national savings and investment patterns which
create current account imbalances. At just about the same time that
American and Japanese officials were organizing the talks, however,
the World Bank issued an urgent call for more, not less, global savings. With this in mind, it was decided that SIT should not ask the
Japanese to save less, except in those instances where Japanese savings
appeared to be propped up by government policies which bias the
choice between savings and consumption. While the U.S. government
has not asked Japan to save less, it has urged Japan to spend more by
increasing its public investment. From the World Bank perspective,
however, the impact on international capital flows of Japan saving less
or spending more is identical.
The original outlook of American officials in raising the public investment issue was long-term. During the 1980s, a succession of Japanese prime ministers worked to cut what had once been a very large
Japanese government deficit by restraining public spending. 5 With
private savings continuing at a high level, the decline in Japan's government deficit allowed it to generate a large current account surplus.
Fearful that this large surplus may persist, American officials have
hoped to reverse Japanese government policies of the 1980s by emphasizing that the 1990s should be a time to vastly improve many of Japan's long-neglected public amenities. American officials have
regularly pointed out to their Japanese counterparts that government
objectives from the mid-1970s for housing, sewerage, parks and waste
16
disposal are still nowhere close to being met.
For their part, Japanese officials have complained that American
participants in SII are showing insufficient appreciation of the considerations which drove Japan's fiscal reconstruction in the 1980s.
Among the advanced industrialized countries, Japan has had one of
15. See the early criticism of this policy in Beigsten, What to Do About the US.-Japan Economic Conflict, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 1059 (1982).
16. M. Boskin, Keynote Address to the Symposium on Structural Adjustment of the AsiaPacific Economies and the Role of the OECD 10 (Oct. 3, 1989).
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the youngest populations, and with it correspondingly low expenditures on social security. However, more than in any of the other advanced industrialized countries, the average age of Japan's population
is increasing rapidly. Before very long, Japan's population will be
among the oldest in the advanced industrialized countries. In the absence of expenditure declines resulting from slower population growth,
the heavy social security expenditures associated with an aging population, under current benefit levels, will force very significant deficits
on Japan's public sector. 17 It is argued that much of the Japanese
government's continuing interest in fiscal austerity has been geared to
these long-term considerations and the need to delay as long as possible the politically unwelcome downward revision in the benefit levels
available to future social security recipients.
While none of this is meant to suggest that there is not a manifest
need for significantly larger Japanese expenditures for social infrastructure, in the view of many Japanese officials current Japanese public sector surpluses have already been committed for other purposes. 1 8
Japan has too long suppressed the aspirations of its citizens for better
public infrastructure and social overhead capital, but it is important to
remember that the average quality of life has improved by a far greater
extent in Japan than in any other major industrialized country over
the course of the past 40 years.
The SII talks began as something of a departure in U.S.-Japanese
economic relations because of their emphasis on deep-rooted issues of
Japan's economic structure. They ended, however, where negotiations
between the United States and Japan have ended so often in the last
twenty years. Great pressure has been brought to bear on Japan to
increase its public spending, not for long-term considerations, but
rather in the interest of short-term, international macroeconomic coordination. In the spring of 1990, the Bush Administration became
pre-occupied with forecasts that the American current account deficit
would reverse course and begin increasing once again. 19 This concern
led it to make obtaining a firm commitment from the Japanese government to expand domestic demand by increasing public spending one of
the very highest priorities of the SII discussions.
Partially in response to requests at the SII talks, the Japanese government has agreed to undertake 430 trillion yen in new public invest17. However, Professor Yukio Noguchi has argued that the aging of the Japanese population
will leave Japan's fiscal balance unchanged. Y. Noguchi, Japan's Fiscal Policy and External
Balance 8-14 (Sept. 1989) (draft).
18. H. ISHI, TIE JAPANESE TAX SYSTEM 284-86 (1989).
19. NOMURA RESEARCH INSTITUTE, NOMURA INVESTMENT REVIEW 3 (Feb. 1990).
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ment during the 1990s. This is a substantial increase over the 263
trillion yen spent on public investment during the 1980s. This spending plan includes record high public investment during the coming
fiscal year. 20 In view of the slowdown in the global economy, in part
as a result of the Gulf crisis, this improvement in Japan's fiscal stance
is viewed by many as highly beneficial.
B. Price Differences
It has long been appreciated that cross-national price differences
are a good way to measure the impact of non-tariff barriers. Unhappily, the absence of strictly comparable cross-national price data has
made it difficult to use this approach in the always contentious discussions about the impact of Japanese trade barriers on Japanese trade
21
volumes and structure.

For example, during the past year, much has been made of the socalled "Forty-Seventh Street Photo phenomenon" which claims that
many Japanese products - in particular, cameras - are sold abroad
at lower prices than at home. 22 Many Japanese government officials
have vehemently rejected this claim, arguing that the products being
priced cross-nationally are simply not comparable. For example, they
argue that Forty-Seventh Street Photo in New York City charges low
prices only because it is selling older models of cameras no longer desired by the Japanese consumer. This controversy bubbled over in the
SII discussions in the fall of 1989. As an outcome of heated discussion
among SII participants, the U.S. Department of Commerce and Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI") agreed
to conduct a detailed joint price survey which would take special pains
to price comparable products in the United States and Japan.
The survey that has been conducted appears to be scrupulous in its
efforts to obtain comparable retail price data. Considerable effort has
been expended to insure that comparable products are being priced in
comparable retail locations. Price observations have been separated
according to whether they are gathered in specialty shops, discount
houses or department stores. Unfortunately, the products included in
this survey in no sense constitute a random sample of the universe of
comparable products available in U.S. and Japanese markets. Rather,
20. THE SlI REPORT, supra note 10, at 1-2 (report by Japanese Delegation).
21. G. SAXONHOUSE, WHAT'S WRONG WITH JAPANESE TRADE STRUCTURE 10 (Pacific
Economic Paper No. 137, 1986); A. DEARDORFF & R. STERN, METHODS OF MEASUREMENT OF
NON-TARIFF BARRIERS 27-28 (University of Michigan Institute of Public Policy Studies Discussion Paper No. 203, 1984).
22. Fallows, Containing Japan, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1989, at 43.
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they are the product of weeks of acrimonious negotiations between
Commerce and MITI. Indeed, the final list could not be agreed upon
until the day before the survey started.
The actual survey results contain some surprises. While there are
certainly many instances of Japanese-produced goods having lower
prices in the United States than in Japan, the "Forty-Seventh Street
Photo phenomenon" does not seem to be pervasive even at Forty-Seventh Street Photo. Of fourteen Japanese-produced cameras and video
camera related products, only six are cheaper in the United States.
Overall, twenty-six of fifty-seven Japanese products were found to be
cheaper in the United States than in Japan. By striking contrast, only
four of thirty-five U.S. products and only two of twenty-one European
products are cheaper in Japan than in the United States. 23
Simply counting up observations of what, in any event, is not a
randomly drawn sample may yield a very misleading impression. The
determinants of the U.S. and Japanese price differences found in the
SII sample have been analyzed in'more systematic statistical fashion. 24
This analysis rejects the "Forty-Seventh Street Photo phenomenon"
and finds that there is no statistically significant difference between
U.S. and Japanese retail prices for goods produced in Japan. By contrast, the hypothesis that there is no statistically significant difference
between U.S. and Japanese retail prices for goods produced in the
United States and Europe cannot be accepted.
Such results may present a problem for those who would argue
that the Japanese market for manufactured products is highly protected. If that were so, both Japanese and foreign products should
have much higher prices in Japan than abroad. The fact that only
foreign products have high prices in Japan suggests a different interpretation. The high prices for U.S. and European products in Japan
may reflect the marketing strategies of oligopolistic firms. U.S. and
European firms may have concluded that they can maximize profits in
the Japanese market through a low-volume, high-price strategy.
C.

Land Use

There is every reason to believe that deregulation of land and some
decline in Japanese land prices might benefit the Japanese economy.
Last year the value of all land in Japan amounted to about $ 10 trillion,
four times the total land value of the United States. Yet, as has been
23. U.S. Dep't of Corn. and Japan Ministry of Int'l Trade and Indus., JointSurvey on United
States and Japan Retail Prices (Washington, D.C., Nov. 1989).
24. W. Cline, Japan's Trade Policies 22-26 (paper delivered to Ministry of International
Trade and Industry Research Institute) (May 1990) (draft).
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noted, an explorer from outer space would almost certainly choose to
claim the 3.6 million square mile territory of the United States rather
25
than Japan's 146,000 square miles.
U.S. negotiators have reasoned that better use of and lower prices
for land might reduce saving and release some spending for purchase
of imports. The issue, however, is more complicated. The relationship between the high price of land, housing conditions and Japan's
high rate of personal savings is not straightforward.
Housing-related saving is not a major cause of Japan's high savings
rate. As might be expected, savings motivated by the desire to own
residential real estate assets, in aggregate, is largely matched by dissaving for much the same purpose. High land, prices increase the
wealth of existing owners. It is not obvious that their increased consumption out of capital gains falls short of the increased savings of
young families seeking housing.
A decline in the price of land should stimulate a short-term boom
in housing investment. Given the very large role that land plays in the
Japanese household balance sheet, in the long run this new housing
investment will be overwhelmed by increases in the household savings
rate needed to compensate for losses in household wealth related to
declining land prices. 26 The net impact may well be to increase the
household sector's financial surplus. In consequence, if SII is supposed to work to reduce Japan's current account surplus, policies
which encourage a decline 'in Japanese land prices may be counterproductive.
Quite apart from the possible counterproductive impact on Japan's
current account surplus, lower land prices may also have other consequences for Japanese resource allocation which might be seen as perverse from the point of view of at least some American interests.
Current Japanese land use policy keeps land cheap for Japanese farmers and expensive for everyone else. To the extent that SII seeks to
help American manufacturers compete with their Japanese counterparts, encouraging a change in Japanese land use policies might not be
helpful.
Beyond handicapping Japanese manufacturers, current Japanese
land use policies may help foreign market access into Japan through
their direct impact on household behavior. Because non-traded services are by their very nature land-intensive, high Japanese land prices
25. Id.
26. Sachs & Boone, Japanese Structural Adjustment and the Balance of Payments, 2 J. JAPAN. & INT'L ECON., 286, 316 (1988).
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bias household choice in the direction of traded goods. This works to
increase Japanese imports of goods and to encourage Japanese travel
overseas to consume foreign non-traded services.
Since at least the late 1970s it has been attractive to American officials seeking to ameliorate international economic tension to make
common cause with the widespread Japanese desire for better housing
conditions and to advocate changes in land use. Changes in Japanese
land use policies are very much in Japan's interest and will enhance
the quality of life there. While this may be sufficient reason for U.S.
officials to encourage the Japanese to make these changes, it must be
recognized that any connection between these policy changes and the
American interest that SII has been designed to further may be quite
tenuous.
However indirect may be the relationships between the change in
Japanese land prices, the adjustment of the Japanese current account
and foreign access to the Japanese market, policies that seek to lower
the price of land appear to be popular in Japan. In response both to
domestic pressure and to the SII discussions, the Japanese government
is undertaking a comprehensive review and adjustment of Japan's
complex system of land taxation in the interest of making taxes more
equitable, neutral and simple. 27 The goal of this adjustment is to reduce the tax system's strong discrimination in favor of land, and
among the land uses, the strong bias of the tax system against the nonagricultural use of land.
Much of the run-up in land prices in Japan in the 1980s may be
less the result of structural factors and more the consequence of a
speculative bubble. Since mid-1989, the Bank of Japan has successfully broken the back of Japanese land speculation by sharply increasing the discount rate. It is unlikely that any of the contemplated
changes in the tax code will have as much influence on land prices as
has this change in central bank policy.
D.

Financial Keiretsu

There is widespread belief in the United States and elsewhere that
Japan's bank-centered industrial groups, known as keiretsu, convey
special competitive advantages. Because it is believed that keiretsu are
institutions uniquely suited to the protection of domestic markets
while taking aggressive advantage of foreign markets where such arrangements are prevented by law, 28 American trade officials have
27. THE SII REPORT, supra note 10, at 11-3 (report by Japanese Delegation).
28. Johnson, Their Behavior, Our Policy, THE NAT'L INTEREST, Fall 1989, at 17, 23-24.
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raised the widespread presence of this institution in Japan as an issue
in the SII talks.
Japan has many keiretsu of one type or another, but today the six
best known are Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Dai-Ichi Kangyo
and Sanwa. Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo are directly descended
from the pre-war zaibatsu which the Supreme Command of the Allied
Powers tried to break up during the American occupation of Japan.
By contrast, the Fuyo, Dai-Ichi Kangyo and Sanwa keiretsu have been
formed largely in the years after 1945. Members of all six keiretsu are
much less closely affiliated than is generally realized. The member
firms in keiretsu with strong pre-war roots purchase only 14.8% of
their procurement from fellow keiretsu members. For the more recently organized keiretsu, procurement from fellow keiretsu members
is still less important, as only 8.9% of procurement is purchased from
29
affiliated firms.
While reciprocal purchasing seems to be too weak to tie keiretsu
together, American government officials remain highly concerned that
cross-shareholding among member firms does allow the keiretsu as a
whole effective control over any individual member firms. In fact,
cross-shareholding is not nearly as pervasive nor so exclusive among
keiretsu members as is commonly believed. Among the six bestknown keiretsu, the average individual firm equity held by all other
members of its keiretsu is 17.9%. 30 While this is a relatively small
amount of cross-holding, if ownership of the firm's remaining equity is
widely dispersed, even this amount might be sufficient to give the
keiretsu control of a member firm. In fact, for a typical member firm,
control of the remaining equity is not widely dispersed. Large blocks
of equity are often held by members of rival keiretsu.31 Such holdings,
if exercised in concert, can be sufficient to block effective keiretsu control of member firms.
Keiretsu ties have substance where member firms are dependent on
the keiretsu main bank for their finance. Dependence on these main
banks has declined dramatically over the past fifteen years. Between
1972 and 1983, over one-quarter of the companies listed on the first

29. KOSEI TORIHIKI 1INKAI, KIGY6 SHUDAN NO JiTrAI NI TSUITE 39-42 (1983). By including transactions between keiretsu firms and their important subsidiaries, these numbers may even
overstate the significance of keiretsu. On the other hand, by including keiretsu trading company
transactions in the denominator of procurement calculations while excluding some of these transactions from the numerator, these figures may downwardly bias the importance of keiretsu ties.
30. ToYO KEIZAI, KIGYO KEIRETSU SORAN (1989).

31. See generally, ToYo KEIZAI, supra note 30.
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section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange changed their main bank.3 2 The
weakening of keiretsu ties goes hand in hand with the declining dependence of large Japanese firms on their banks. In 1974, Japanese firms
capitalized at more than one billion yen relied on banks for 46.7% of
their new financing. Just ten years later no more than 6% of new
investment by these large Japanese firms was financed by bank
33
borrowing.
American government officials have been mistaken in identifying
Japanese cross-shareholding as primarily a keiretsu phenomenon. Extensive cross-shareholding in Japan is a relatively recent occurrence.
While always present to some degree since the joint-stock form
emerged in Japan 115 years ago, its greatly increased importance in
recent years has gone hand in hand with the increasing risk in Japan of
corporate takeovers. As long as Japanese companies relied on shortterm bank loans for a major part of their financing, main banks were
in a position to negate the value of any takeover bid. As Japanese
companies have relied more heavily on retained earnings for new financing and as financial liberalization has made the issue of new equity more practical, the veto power once exercised by a company's
main bank has greatly diminished. Cross-shareholding has thus
emerged as a widely recommended strategy urged by Japanese lawyers
to stave off takeover bids. Rather than being part of the old keiretsu
system, in many respects it is an alternative to it.
It is not that Japanese companies are uniquely averse to hostile
takeovers of foreign origin; they are opposed to any hostile takeover
bid, whatever the origin. While this attitude certainly constrains foreign participation in the Japanese economy, this extreme aversion can
be rationalized on economic grounds. Given Japan's anemic and often
nonexistent market for experienced managers, research and development personnel and even production workers, and given that all these
personnel have made large firm-specific investments in human capital
which can only be recouped if they remain with their firms, the typical
Japanese interest in preventing a hostile takeover bid of a company
must be far greater than would be the case in the United States. In the
absence of a radical change in the structure of Japanese labor markets,
which no one on the American side has suggested, there are very good
economic reasons for the management of Japanese companies going to
32. Horiuchi, Packer, & Fukuda, What Role has the "Main Bank" Played in Japan?, 2 J.
JAPAN & INT'L ECON. 159, 165 (1988).

33. D. Meerschwam, The Japanese Financial System 35 (paper presented at National Bureau
of Economic Research Conference on the United States and Japan: Trade and Investment, Oct.
1989).
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great lengths to prevent hostile takeovers. This would be true even if
Japanese companies operated under American securities law. Moreover, for all the discussion of Japanese cross-shareholding in SII,
cross-shareholding is generally not against U.S..laws.
E. Exclusionary Business Practices
Under the general heading of Japanese exclusionary business practices, American negotiators have grouped four somewhat related topics. These include bid-rigging and the enforcement of Japan's AntiMonopoly Law, abuse of intellectual property rights and the exclusionary procurement practices of private firms.
Bid-rigging is a problem in Japan's construction industry, but it is
not a practice which is unique to that country. While there are clearly
a number of specific, well-documented cases where blatant bid-rigging
has occurred in Japan's construction industry, the case that this is a
more serious problem in Japan than elsewhere remains to be made.
While bid-rigging may be as pervasive as alleged, it is hard to see that
it is having an internationally distinctive impact on the performance of
the Japanese construction industry. Japan's construction industry
currently employs 5.3 million workers or 9% of Japan's labor force.
This is a much larger proportion of the total labor force than the 6.5%
employed in the American construction industry, but it is hardly unprecedented. For example, 9% of the Italian labor force is also em34
ployed in construction.
The collusion which makes bid-rigging possible is in violation of
Japan's Anti-Monopoly Act. American officials complain that the
Japanese government often seems unwilling to enforce this statute, not
just against bid-rigging but any collusive action. Japan's Fair Trade
Commission, which is charged with enforcing this statute, prefers informal consultations with the parties concerned to any kind of formal
proceeding. Since Japan's Anti-Monopoly Act contains no private
right of action, this means, in comparison with U.S. or even European
practice, there is very little litigation under this statute. When litigation does occur, the resulting penalties for violation of the Anti-Monopoly Law appear to be very modest.
It is ironic that at just the time when American officials are urging
the Japanese government to remake their anti-trust law according to
the American model, students of American productivity are arguing
that it is America's anti-trust law that is undermining American performance. As William Baumol notes:
34. NIHON GINKO, KoKUsAI HIKAKU TOKEI 139 (1989).
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[T]he United States may well not be suffering from a loss of entrepreneurial talent and initiative, as has sometimes been suggested.
Rather, if there is a problem in this arena (a conjecture that is, in any
event, very difficult to test), much of the difficulty may be a misdirection
of entrepreneurial talent rather than its disappearance. Moreover,
whether conditions on the entrepreneurial front have or have not deteriorated, surely an injection of productive entrepreneurship should contribute to productivity. And this can be achieved by closing off, to the
extent that is practicable, the most attractive opportunities for rent seeking. The Japanese example shows how this can be done by suitable alterations in the economic "rules of the game." Even if we do not want to
go as far as Japan has in discouraging private antitrust suits, for example, more moderate rules of a similar sort are easily formulated. And
one can be quite sure that, once suitable measures have closed off or at
least impeded access to the avenues for unproductive entrepreneurship,
entrepreneurial energy and talent will automatically be redirected to the
productive means that still remain open. Such measures can benefit
other industrialized countries, and not just the United States. However,
as we have seen, there is reason to suspect
that in this area it is the
35
United States that has the most to gain.
During the time the SII talks have been ongoing, there has been a
great deal of discussion both at these talks and in other fora about the
procurement practices of private firms. The long-term relationships
Japanese firms maintain with their suppliers are said to be a major
barrier against foreign access to the Japanese market. Whatever the
merits of these allegations, in the absence of market-sharing agreements which the Bush Administration opposes in principle, there may
be little that can be done to force private firms to buy imports that
they do not desire. If SII and other bilateral and multilateral initiatives work to insure that there is competition in Japan's final goods
markets, it may make little difference to foreign welfare that Japanese
firms wish to continue to purchase imports from high-cost domestic
suppliers. If Japanese firms wish to handicap themselves in this way,
what foreign firms lose in intermediate goods markets, they will make
up in final goods markets. In any event, experience has shown that
when Japanese producers are confronted with vigorous competition,
they are quite prepared to shift from domestic to foreign suppliers in
the interest of maintaining market shares and profits. For example,
when Japan's tobacco market was finally opened to foreign competition in the mid- and late 1980s, the newly privatized Japan Tobacco
Corporation discarded decades-old relationships with domestic cigarette paper suppliers and packagers in an effort to remain competitive.
It is often difficult to understand why there is so much emphasis on
35. W. BAUMOL, S.
276-77 (1989).
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Japanese firms' relationships with their suppliers. Formally speaking,
American firms are far more vertically integrated than their Japanese
counterparts. For example, eighty percent of the purchased value of a
General Motors automobile is provided either by GM or its whollyowned subsidiaries. By contrast, in Japan, on average only 25% of an
automobile's purchase value is made in-house for Japanese manufacturers.3 6 If there is nothing discriminatory or collusive about the possibly much larger American intra-company transactions, it is difficult
to see what is discriminatory or collusive about similar Japanese
practices.
As part of the SII talks, and in an effort to deal with anti-competitive practices as might arise from either long-standing vertical or horizontal relationships, the Japanese government has agreed to enhance
the Anti-Monopoly Act and to significantly increase the resources devoted to its enforcement. The Fair Trade Commission has had its staff
permanently increased by 20%. It is anticipated that with this enlarged staff, the Fair Trade Commission will resort to more transparent, formal proceedings, including criminal actions, when dealing with
alleged collusion by Japanese firms. The Japanese government also is
in the process of submitting a bill to the Diet which would increase the
37
financial penalties for violations of the Anti-Monopoly Act.
F. DistributionSystem
While great concern with the procurement practices of Japanese
private firms and with the low priority given shareholders' rights by
Japan's Ministry of Finance may not be warranted provided there is
free entry into Japan's final goods market, the operation of Japan's
Large-Scale Retail Store Law does call this premise into question.
This law provides that a construction plan for any store of more than
500 square meters must be discussed by a committee of the local
Chamber of Commerce and approved by the prefectural governor
and/or the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Since the
early 1980s, the administration of this law has been such that it has
commonly taken more than two years for a construction plan to receive final approval. Before final approval is granted, some adjustment
is often made in the floor space, the number of days the store will be
open during a week, the store hours and the total number of days the
store will be open during the year.3 8
36. Aoki, HorizontalY& VerticalInformation Structure of the Firm, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 971,
973 (1986).
37. THE SII REPORT, supra note 10, at IV-3 (report by Japanese Delegation).
38. T. Ito & M. Maruyama, Is the Japanese Distribution System Really Inefficient? 14 (pa-
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For all the nuisance value of this law, its actual impact on the
character of Japanese distribution is difficult to establish. Contrary to
its overseas reputation, the Japanese distribution system does not appear to be inefficient. While there are many small stores in Japan,
productivity is high and profit margins are not out of line with the
39
experience of most other countries, including the United States.
Even in the absence of the Large-Scale Retail Store Law, Japan would
have an abundance of small stores because the space in the average
Japanese home is extremely limited and because Japanese retailers
have very low re-order costs. 4°
Even if the Large-Scale Retail Store Law is effective in changing
the size mix of retail establishments, should U.S. trade officials be concerned? To be sure, there is some reason to believe that the size distribution of retail and wholesale establishments can make a difference for
the access of foreign products to the Japanese market. Japan's large
department stores and supermarket chains import directly from overseas, while smaller retailers and whosesalers must typically rely on one
of the giant general trading companies to stock their shelves and
inventories. By relying on these general trading companies, which
handle a majority of all Japanese imports, small-scale Japanese distributors' opportunities to stock foreign products may be limited. It is
argued that Japan's trading companies may restrict what they import,
not so much as to protect their own domestic production, of which
they do little, but rather to protect the interests of other firms to which
they are tied through their keiretsu affiliations. It remains an open
question, however, whether keiretsu ties are sufficiently strong to warrant any conclusion about the impact trading companies might have
on the level and structure of Japanese imports.
Under pressure from the SIT negotiations, the Japanese government has undertaken both to revise the administration of the LargeScale Retail Store Law and to consider revising the Law itself. Under
the new administrative guidelines being implemented, neither MITI
nor local governments will be able to delay beyond a year and one-half
the approval of building plans for retail stores. Efforts to further
deregulate the distribution industry and to remove the many handiper presented at National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on the United States and
Japan: Trade and Investment, Oct. 1989).
39. M. Maruyama, Y. Togawa, K. Sakai, N. Sakamoto & M. Arakawa, Distribution System
and Business Practices in Japan 5-6 (paper presented at EPA International Symposium, Oct. 1213, 1989).

40. D. Flath, Why Are There So Many Retail Stores in Japan? 5 (Oct. 1987) (unpublished
manuscript).
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caps placed on large-scale distributors are also being pursued. 4'
CONCLUSION

While heralded as a new departure in international economic relations, in fact the Structural Impediments Initiative discussions are the
culmination of decades of bilateral negotiations between the United
States and Japan. Because of the asymmetry in U.S.-Japanese trade
relations, the U.S. government has repeatedly found it efficacious to
deal with Japan largely outside of the formal disciplines of multilateral
institutions. American trade officials and businessmen have long believed that harmonizing Japan's domestic economic institutions with
those of the United States will lead to more intimate and more balanced economic relations between Japan and the United States.
This article concludes that the traditional theory of comparative
advantage does not provide a rationale for SII. However, new developments in international trade theory, particularly those theories
which explain the structure and volume of intra-industry trade, do
suggest that mutually beneficial increases in trade can result as two
dissimilar economies come increasingly to resemble one another.
Unfortunately, in practice a number of the proposals being urged
on the Japanese in the context of SII may have consequences directly
opposite from those intended by their proponents. The decline in the
price of Japanese land sought by American negotiators in SIT may increase rather than lower Japan's current account surplus. Japan's importation of America's anti-trust laws may make the Japanese
economy less, rather than more, efficient.
Finally, SII may constitute a far deeper intrusion into the Japanese
economy than is necessary in order to achieve its stated objective. Discriminatory purchasing practices by private Japanese firms, whatever
their cause, for the most part cannot long be sustained if final goods
markets in Japan are open to vigorous competition from foreign manufacturers. For this reason, U.S. trade officials are correct in making
the reform of Japan's distribution system one of their highest
priorities.
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